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Although existing research reveals interesting relations explaining redistribution demand,
little is known about the impact of the contract type and the macroeconomic context in
shaping redistribution preferences of individuals. We analyze the Spanish dual labor market
to provide causal evidence of the effect of temporal contracts in determining preferences for
redistribution. To do so, exact matching is applied to Spanish data from the European Social
Survey for the period 2002-2014. Furthermore, we analyze the heterogeneous effect of the
contract type by studying the impact of the economic crisis starting in 2008. Our results
give causal support to the insurance theory by showing that the fact of holding a temporal
contract increases preferences for redistribution. Nevertheless, this effect disappears when
the effect of the adverse macroeconomic context is considered. The riskier economic context
makes risk perception of individuals holding permanent contracts increase, which results in
stronger demand for redistribution. This macroeconomic effect determining preferences for
redistribution appears to be stronger than the individual determinant of holding a specific
contract type.
Keywords: Temporal, Redistribution, Preferences, Dual Labor Market, Individual, Macroe-
conomic, Crisis, Determinants, Matching.
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1 Introduction
Individuals facing higher risk in the labor market have stronger incentives to support govern-
ment redistribution (Iversen and Soskice, 2001). But, are individual characteristics the main
determinant of redistribution preferences? Existing research reveals interesting relationships
explaining redistribution demand but little is known about the impact of the macroeconomic
context in determining redistribution preferences. Basic theory of preferences for redistribu-
tion states that when inequality increases, redistribution demand should also increase (Meltzer
and Richard, 1981). While the Gini coefficient in United States is 38.5 and 29.1 in Europe,
redistributive policies are more extensive in Europe, where the overall size of the government
is about 50 percent larger and the tax structure is more progressive (Alesina and Angeletos,
2005). Furthermore, redistributive policies are found to be more generous in countries with
a relatively egalitarian pre-tax distribution of income (Moene and Wallerstein, 2003). During
the last decades, income inequality in the developed world has been increasing fostering the
attention devoted to determinants of redistributive polices (Roser, 2016).
An extended body of literature has looked at the determinants of preferences for redistri-
bution both at a macroeconomic and individual level. One of the main theories explaining
demand for redistribution focuses on the role that income redistribution has as a type of public
insurance, while looking at individual risk as a main determinant of redistribution preferences
(Moene and Wallerstein, 2001; Iversen and Soskcie, 2001; Cusack et al., 2006). Alesina and
Angeletos (2005) use the different beliefs in societies about how individual effort determines
income to explain why economies had not been reacting to the expansion of income inequality
and the notorious differences in redistribution across countries. Furthermore, racial and eth-
nic heterogeneity undermines redistribution demand as people are more altruistic toward those
who resemble themselves (Alesina and Glaeser, 2004; Lupu and Pontusson, 2011). Individual
characteristics such as the level of education, income, age, gender, the fact of belonging to a
labor union or living in a rural area are found to be important determinants in shaping redis-
tribution preferences (e.g. Ravallion and Lokshin, 2000; Iversen and Soskice, 2001; Finseraas,
2009). One important individual characteristic determining demand for redistribution is the
probability of losing a job and becoming unemployed. When looking at segmented labor mar-
kets, factors influencing redistribution demand mentioned above play a different role. While in
non-segmented labor markets, lower levels of education and income are associated with stronger
preferences for redistribution, this association becomes weaker when the labor market is dual
(Fernández-Albertos and Manzanos, 2016). In addition, Berens (2015) uses data from Latin
American Countries to show that in dual labor markets, formal and informal workers have simi-
lar redistributive preferences, but are influenced differently by individual characteristics such as
the level of education or left-right ideology.
In order to complement previous literature on the determinants of redistribution, this study
provides causal evidence supporting the insurance theory. According to this approach, indi-
viduals have stronger redistribution preferences since it is seen as a public insurance against
potential income losses. Using data from the European Social Survey for the period 2002-2014
in Spain, we find causal evidence that temporal contracts have a positive effect in determining
redistribution preferences. The Spanish labor market is characterized to be a dual labor market
since 30 percent of the workers are subject to temporal contracts, implying low employment pro-
tection, while the rest enjoy much more protected and stable positions derived from permanent
contracts. In this dual context, the fact of holding a temporal contract increases support for
redistribution since the probability of being unemployed is higher and it derives in a stronger
demand for social insurance against potential income loses. Therefore, the first hypothesis we
test is whether individuals holding a temporal contract, and thus a riskier situation in the labor
market, have stronger redistribution preferences than those holding permanent contracts. Exact
matching is used to obtain a matched sample of individuals that are identical in those character-
istics determining both the fact of holding a temporal contract and redistribution preferences.
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As in the matched sample, the contract type an individual hold is determined randomly, we are
able to disentangle the causal effect of temporal contracts on preferences for redistribution. Fur-
thermore, the period analyzed encompasses two very different macroeconomic contexts derived
from the economic crisis starting in 2008. This fact allows us to study the heterogeneous effect
of temporal contracts in redistribution preferences depending on the macroeconomic context
considered. Thus, the second hypothesis we test is whether macroeconomic rather individual
characteristics play a more important role in defining redistribution preferences.
Our results give support to the insurance theory since suggest that when risk perception in
the labor market is high, preference for redistribution become stronger. In favorable economic
contexts, the fact of holding a temporal contract increases the probability to strongly support
redistribution by 12.13 percent. This effect disappears when the adverse macroeconomic context
is considered. In the crisis period, individuals holding permanent contracts become 37.1 percent
more likely to strongly support redistribution because of the perception of a riskier environment.
This macroeconomic effect determining preferences for redistribution appears to be stronger than
the individual determinant of holding a specific contract type.
The rest of the study is structured as follows. Section two provides a theoretical discussion
of the previous work done on the determinants for redistribution preferences. Section three
presents the institutional setting in which the study will be developed. Section four introduces
the empirical strategy used to determine the effect of temporal contracts. Section five presents
the results. Finally, section six concludes.
2 Theoretical Discussion
This section provides a theoretical discussion about mechanisms and individual characteristics
determining preferences for redistribution. In order to provide an easy understanding of the
different bodies of literature, this discussion is divided into five parts. First, basic theory on
redistribution preferences developed by Meltzer and Richard (1981) as well as the relation-
ship between income inequality and redistribution is discussed. Second, redistribution can also
be seen as a social insurance. Therefore, the link between risk and redistribution demand is
presented. The third part presents different macroeconomic theories explaining potential mech-
anisms behind redistribution preferences as well as the effect of ethnic and religious heterogeneity
in determining the size of the welfare system. Fourth, individual characteristics driving different
degrees of preferences for redistribution are discussed. Finally, the role of the labor market in
defining redistribution demand is considered.
2.1 Income Inequality and Redistribution
Basic theory of preferences for redistribution builds upon Meltzer and Richard (1981) general
equilibrium model and states that when inequality increases, redistribution demand should also
increase. Nevertheless, empirical research has found that such prediction is not always satisfied
and often more egalitarian countries are the ones linked to higher social spending (Moene and
Wallerstein, 2003). Meltzer and Richard (1981) general equilibrium model explains the size of
government through voter’s demand for redistribution. In their model, where voters are fully
informed about the government’s size, a more skewed pre-tax income distribution, and therefore
lower ratios of the median to the mean income before taxes, brings increases in the government
size due to a higher level of welfare desired by a majority of voters. While Finseraas (2009)
shows for a cross-section sample of 22 European regions that the level of inequality is positively
linked with demand for redistribution, Moene and Wallerstein (2003)1 and Iversen and Soskice
1Moene and Wallerstein (2003) use data from the OECD on spending in social-insurance programs as a share
of GDP and wage inequality for eighteen countries for the years 1985, 1990 and 1995.
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(2001),2 among others, find the opposite relation.
In order to test Meltzer and Richard’s (1981) theory, several studies have analyzed the
relationship between inequality and income redistribution in different sets of countries and con-
texts. In a diverse sample of 26 countries, Lübker (2006) shows the lack of significant bivariate
relationship between the Gini-Index of the income distribution and the aggregate demand for
redistribution. Furthermore, he attributes the influence of social justice norms, differing between
groups of culturally similar countries, to the different levels of redistribution observed. Not only
the demand for redistribution, but also the relationship between inequality and social-insurance
spending, such as pension or health care, as a share of the GDP in advanced industrial soci-
eties is found to be uncorrelated with wages and salary inequalities. Policies that constitute a
large share of the welfare benefit from unemployment insurance, active labor-market policies or
occupational illness and injury are found to be significantly more generous in countries with a
relatively egalitarian pre-tax distribution of wages and salaries (Moene and Wallerstein, 2003).
In advanced democracies, Iversen and Soskice (2001) demonstrate, through differences in skill
composition, why income equality is linked to higher social spending in cross-national compar-
isons. According to their model, workers who have made heavy investments in asset-specific
skills have stronger incentives to support policies and institutions that protect their jobs and
income since they stand a greater risk of losing a substantial portion of their income than do
workers who have portable skills. Therefore, national educational systems heavily based in vo-
cational training are strongly positively related both to skill specificity and pretax equality. This
tendency can help explain the cross-national variance in social protection.
2.2 The Social Insurance Approach: Risk and Redistribution
Redistribution can be viewed as a social insurance and therefore, its demand may be explained
from a self-interest or insurance approach. Moene and Wallerstein (2001) suggest that voters
have both redistributive and insurance motives to support welfare spending. These authors
claim that the effect of inequality will depend on who is targeted for redistribution policies.
When pretax income inequality is greater, support for policies targeted to people who have
lost their market income is lower than for policies targeted to working individuals. Therefore,
the link between increasing inequality and lower support for redistribution can be explained by
the fact that policies constituting a significant share of the welfare budget are targeted to non-
worker individuals. Iversen and Soskice (2001) use the insurance component of redistribution to
present a theory that emphasizes people’s skills composition in a model where portability of skills
is inversely related with risk. According to them, individuals with specific skills that are not
easily portable across jobs, firms or industries, have a greater risk of losing a substantial portion
of their income and, therefore, have stronger incentives to support policies and institutions
protecting their jobs and incomes than workers with portable skills. Even though the own
position in the income distribution affects individual’s social spending preferences, at any level
of income, workers with specific skills are more inclined to support higher levels of protection
than those with general skills. Even if the relationship between demand for employment benefits
and personal unemployment risk is positive, the homogeneity of the risk pool, and therefore the
amount of people who net benefits, will determine general preferences (Rehm, 2011). Thus,
from the social insurance approach, exposure to labor market risks is highly related to stronger
redistribution preferences due to reduced individual income and the demand of insurance against
risk of future income loss (Cusack, et al. 2006).
2Iversen and Soskice (2001) use data from 11 advanced democracies from two sets of national mass surveys
conducted under the International Social Survey Program, one in 1996 and the other in 1997 (ISSP 1999, 2000).
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2.3 Macroeconomic Determinants, Heterogeneity and the Welfare-State Size
Alesina and Angeletos (2005) provide an explanation to the empirical evidence contradicting
Meltzer and Richard’s (1981) model through a theory of fairness and social competition. They
explain that not only economies had not been reacting to the expansion of income inequality, but
differences across countries are also notorious. According to their theory, societies believing that
individual effort determines income will be more likely to choose low levels of redistribution and
taxes compared to societies believing in luck, connections or determinants of wealth away from
the individual control, which will levy higher taxes and redistributive policies. Furthermore,
Cusack et al. (2006) propose a model that captures both the redistributive and insurance
aspects of public spending, where the response of the government to economic shocks will depend
on the electoral system. According to their model, proportional representation systems bring
stronger redistribution, since they tend to advantage the center-left as well as make longer term
commitments, while majoritarian systems tend to do the opposite. Moreover, distrust in the
government might inhibit respondents from translating their concerns for inequality into support
for redistribution while policy preferences might respond more to emotional than factual appeals
(Kuziemko et al., 2015). If this is the case, inequality and poverty might be seen as a serious
problem but have no effect on policy outcomes.
Another body of literature attempts to give an answer to the different levels of redistribution
observed among countries. On one hand, social affinity theory uses non-economic factors to state
that rising inequality undermines the sense of social affinity between the middle class and the
poor. Alesina and Glaeser (2004) show evidence that racial and ethnic heterogeneity undermines
preferences for redistribution as people are more likely to be altruistic toward those who resemble
themselves; phenomena that is magnified when minorities are overepresented among the poor.
What matters at the time of shaping preferences for redistribution, is the structure, rather than
the level, of inequality. Lupu and Pontusson (2011) complement the literature on racial and
ethnic heterogeneity by introducing a factor controlling for social distance. They show that
voters will be inclined to ally with low-income individuals and support redistributive policies
when the distance between the poor and the middle class is small relative to the distance between
the middle and the rich. Using data from Swedish municipalities, Dahlberg et al. (2012) find
that an increase in the share of immigrants led to lower preferred levels of social benefits. Since
immigrants are generally characterized to be net-beneficiaries of social polices, the negative effect
of migration on redistribution is especially pronounced for individuals in the upper tail of the
income and wealth distributions. Similarly, the aggregate increase in immigrant density during
the 1998-2006 period in Spain caused municipal social services spending to fall (Jofre-Montseny
et al., 2016). Therefore, when racial or ethnic minorities comprise a significant proportion of
the poor or lower-skilled, social distance increases and the median voter is less likely to support
redistributive policies either due to an increase in ethnic heterogeneity or due to an increase in
the cost of redistribution.
Complementary explanations to the heterogeneity, social distance and insurance theories are
given by Corneo and Grüner (2002) who show that the conventional economic motivation, taking
solely income into account, is only one of the factors determining preferences for redistribution.
From their analysis, both public values and concerns for their own social standing appear to
be significant factors shaping individual attitudes toward the government’s attempt to reduce
economic inequality. On one hand, the public values effect follows the same logic than the theory
of fairness and social competition of Alesina and Angeletos (2005) and implies that the demand
for redistribution is negatively related to stronger perceptions of the individual’s responsibility at
the time of generating income. On the other hand, the social rivalry effect arises when preferences
for redistribution are driven by the consideration that governmental redistribution affects the
quality of the individual’s social environment. Therefore, it implies that individual concerns
for their own social standing is a determinant of redistribution demand. Similarily, the tunnel
effect, according to which is the prospect of future wealth what determines today’s redistribution
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preferences, might be used to explain why rising inequality is tolerated in rapidly developing
countries. Therefore, individuals in a rising trajectory may oppose redistribution, even if they
are in a more disadvantaged position, and those in a downward trajectory, even if being well-off,
may favor it (Ravallion and Lokshin, 2000). Estimating a random-effects probit for Russian
survey data from 1992 to 1996, Ravallion and Lokshin (2000) obtain results suggesting that
support for redistribution is stronger among those who fear that their welfare will fall. Among
individuals who expect things to get better, support for redistribution is weaker. Moreover, a
pronounced current income effect attenuating the desire for redistribution appears. In European
countries, support for redistribution is higher when the level of poverty is disproportionally high
but this fact is not due to inequality-aversion of the rich (Finseraas, 2012). Nevertheless, the
differences in redistribution support between the rich and the middle class are larger in regions
where the proportion of ethnic minorities among the poor is high. In this case, rich respondents
are less likely to support redistribution due to a smaller fear of downward income mobility
(Finseraas, 2012).
2.4 Individual Characteristics
Besides macro-level redistribution theories, a broad body on individual determinants of redistri-
bution demand has been developed. It is an individual’s occupation, especially the risk exposure
related to its occupation that helps shaping redistribution preferences. Rehm (2009) claims the
risk exposure at the occupational level, measured through occupational unemployment, rather
than at the industry level, as suggested by traditional accounts, to be the determining fact
shaping individual’s risk perception and therefore redistribution demand. Due to the fact that
preferences for insurance decrease with income when controlling for risk, macro theories should
consider the joint distribution of income and risk exposure (Rehm, 2009 and 2011; Ravallion and
Lokshin, 2000). As the redistribution as insurance approach suggests, individual risk exposure
is one of the main determinants of preferences for redistribution (Cusack et al., 2006; Rehm,
2009).
There has been extensive research into the individual-level factors determining redistribution
preferences done by and Ravallion and Lokshin (2000), Iversen and Soskice (2001), Cusack et
al. (2006), Finseraas (2009) and Rehm (2009, 2011) among others.3 According to this line
of research, age is found to be positively related with redistribution demand. Older workers
are more disadvantaged in the labor market because their ability to find new employment is
likely to be more limited than for younger workers. Furthermore, their time to retirement is
shorter and preferences for redistribution are, therefore, stronger. Women are more supportive of
redistribution than men, since they tend to be the primary care-giver in the family. This places
women at a disadvantaged position in the labor market compared to men, as they need to not
only leave but also return to the labor market. Education is found to be negatively related with
redistribution support. Typically, higher levels of education provide a good insurance against
adverse labor market dynamics, since they are related with more marketable skills and thus lower
probability of income loss due to unemployment. Furthermore, as more educated people expect
to be upwardly mobile, they believe they are less likely to benefit from welfare redistributive
policies (Fernández-Albertos and Manzano, 2016). Finally, left-right wing individual position is
found to be negatively related with redistribution demand, since supporters of rightist parties
express less support for social spending than supporters of leftish parties.
Further socioeconomic determinants are also considered. Ravallion and Lokshin (2000) find
3Ravallion and Lokshin (2000) use data across the Russian Federation from the Russian Longitudinal Monitor-
ing Survey for the period 1992-1996; Iversen and Soskice (2001) use data from 11 advanced democracies; Cusack
et al. (2006) exploit data from the International Social Survey Programme; Finseraas (2009) uses data of 22
European countries for the year 2001; Rehm(2009) uses a new comprehensive dataset on economic dynamics in
occupations and industries across countries in the European Union married with public opinion data from the
European Social Survey; Rehm (2011) uses data from the 2006 International Social Survey Programme.
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the number of pensioners in the family, being married and the fact of living in a rural area to
enhance preferences for redistribution. Since the decision of joining a labor union is likely to
arise because an individual is concerned about the security of his/her job, and a union function
consists to insure their members against labor market risks, such members are more likely to
highly support redistribution (Cusack et al., 2006; Iversen and Soskice, 2001). Finseraas (2009)
shows that large households with low incomes, individuals belonging to a minority group and
people who rarely go to church are more likely to support redistribution. Cusack et al. (2006)
considers the occupation of the individual to be related with redistribution preferences for three
reasons. First, public employees are, in general, more supportive of larger governments than
private sector employees. Secondly, the retired are beneficiaries of redistributive policies, and
therefore should support redistribution. And third, the self-employed depend on flexible markets
and frequently rely on hiring relatively low-paid labor. Iversen and Soskice (2001) demonstrate
that the self-employed are more likely to oppose social spending while part time employees and
those outside the labor market do not differ from the attitudes of others.
2.5 Redistribution Demand and the Labor Market Structure
Special attention should be paid to preferences for redistribution in dual labor markets. Alt and
Iversen (2017) complement Rehm’s (2011) analysis by introducing the connection between risk
and labor market segmentation. They complement previous literature by combining a model
of altruism and heterogeneity, according to which individuals become less altruistic toward the
poor when minorities are over-represented in this segment of the population, with a model
based on self-interest and insurance. By doing so, they show that labor market segmentation
(previously omitted in the literature) has more consistent effects on redistribution demand than
social distance. From this approach, higher segmentation of the labor market, into secure and
insecure segments, might reduce or maintain support for distribution while needs might be
sharply rising, not because the middle class supports the poor less, but because they perceive
less risk to be poor themselves.
Evidence of the dynamics described previously in dual labor markets is provided by Fernández-
Albertos and Manzanos (2016) as well as by Berens (2015). Fernández-Albertos and Manzanos
(2015) provide evidence that dualism in the labor market weakens the association between so-
cioeconomic status and welfare state preferences. Using individual data for 22 countries from the
European Social Survey, they show that in dual labor markets the relation between low levels
of income, low levels of education and precarious labor market positions are dramatically less
associated with greater welfare support. European social security systems provide benefits as a
function of previous contributions. In dual markets, this implies that the system tends to dis-
proportionally protect workers under standard permanent contracts. Since individuals with low
levels of income and education tend to be overrepresented among outsiders, dual labor markets
make those individuals holding non-standard contracts and the unemployed less supportive of
welfare state expansion bringing systems to redistribute less from the rich to the poor. Following
the same line, Berens (2015) uses data from the Latin American Public Opinion Project which
is conducted in 24 Latin American and Caribbean countries in 2008 and 2010, to show that
formal and informal sector workers have similar redistributive preferences. While formal wage
earners are influenced by common theories such as economic self-interest and left-right ideology,
what matters for informal wage earners is different. For individuals belonging to the informal
market, education is positively related with preferences for redistribution, due to an interest
of insurance against higher education costs, because of their vulnerable status in the economy.
Furthermore, left-right ideology positively influences redistributive preferences of the formally
employed and does not affect informal workers, religiosity has a robust negative effect on social
policy preferences of informal workers.
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Hypothesis to be tested
Up to this point the literature has found how individual characteristics can affect perceptions
of risk and therefore preferences for redistribution. Even though dual labor markets had been
analyzed, little attention has been paid to further contextual characteristics. A model devel-
oped by Iversen and Soskice (2001) points to unanticipated shocks to the occupational structure
as an important source of cross-time variance in support for social protection. When workers
invest heavily in skills that are not fully transferable, an increase in the risk of having to move
across a skill boundary in the economy raises the level of demand for social insurance. Although
theory implies that people discount cyclical unemployment, national unemployment may still
affect individual-level social preferences. According to Berens (2015) an economically risky en-
vironment, reflected by a high unemployment rate, does not significantly influence redistributive
preferences of informal workers but presents no evidence about formal workers.
Although existing research reveals interesting relations explaining redistribution demand, as
Dahlber et al. (2012) notice, large part of the evidence is best described as descriptive rather
than causal. Little attention has been devoted to the link between contextual characteristics
effecting the labor market, such as the effect of expansion or recession periods, and redistribu-
tion preferences. The literature widely states that the risk faced by an individual is a major
factor determining redistribution preferences. Moreover, the fact of being subject to a temporal
contract, and therefore to more unstable employment and worse labor outcomes (Garćıa-Pérez
et al., 2016) might increase the risk perception of temporary workers.
The aim of this project is to provide causal evidence on the insurance theory. The first hy-
pothesis we will test is whether the fact of holding a temporal contract has a positive impact on
redistribution preferences. To do so, we study the Spanish dual labor market by applying exact
matching at individual level data from the European Social Survey for the period 2002-2014.
The period considered contains two very different economic contexts divided by the economic
crisis starting in 2008. Exploiting this variation, the second hypothesis to be tested is whether
the macroeconomic context matters at the time of shaping redistribution demand. Finally, we
test whether temporal contracts have a heterogeneous effect in determining redistribution pref-
erences depending on the macroeconomic context considered. Our results complement existing
literature by providing causal evidence supporting the insurance theory. Furthermore, we pro-
vide insight on individual determinants of redistribution by showing that temporal contracts
and adverse macroeconomic contexts have a positive effect in redistribution demand. Even
though the effect of temporal contracts is positive, when the economic situation is adverse,
macroeconomic characteristics are the ones that have a stronger effect.
3 Institutional Setting
3.1 The Spanish Labor Market
A dual labor market can be characterized as a market with large differences between workers
subjected to different labor regulations. While a share of workers, known as insiders, are sub-
jected to a stricter set of labor regulations and, therefore, highly protected, a substantial share
of workers, known as outsiders, are subjected to lax regulations and, thus, lower protection and
facing higher risks. With almost one third of the working population holding temporal contracts
under lax regulation and two thirds of the population benefiting from the rigid protection at-
tached to permanent contracts, the Spanish labor market provides an example of a dual labor
market. Before 1975, the Spanish labor market was heavily regulated with most of contracts
being permanent and protected by strong labor regulations and stringent judicial protection.
After the death of the dictator Francisco Franco, the Worker’s Statute, which established the
main labor market institutions of the new democratic regime and introduced collective bargain-
ing, was approved in 1980. Nevertheless, the first and most important reform promoted to relax
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labor market regulation was the liberalization of free labor unions in 1977.
Contracts were generally assumed to be open-ended since temporal contracts4 could only
be used for jobs, such as substitution of permanent workers or seasonal jobs, whose nature
was temporary. Besides restrictions in the use of temporal contracts, employment protection
regulation was very different for both contract types. While in case of dismissal, temporal
contracts were subject to payments of eight days per year of seniority, permanent workers would
receive payments of 20 days of salary per year of job tenure, with a maximum of one year of
salary, or 45 days per year of job tenure with a maximum of 42 months of wages, depending
on the fairness or unfairness of the dismissal. The stringent judicial protection that was still
characterizing the Spanish labor market, implied that workers who disagreed with the dismissal
could sue the firm. In this legal process the firm had to pay the judicial costs, at any case, and
the lost salaries, in case of being solved in favor of the worker, which was the most common
case. Therefore, often the costs that this process was implying for the firm were higher than the
payments associated to the fair dismissal (Garćıa-Pérez et al., 2016).
During the first half of 1980s, unemployment rate in Spain experienced a rapid growth going
from the 3.8 percent in 1976 to over 20 percent in 1984. The modernization of the of the labor
market as well as the economic context of high unemployment prompted the Spanish Government
to liberalize the use of temporary contracts. To do so, the labor market reform of 1984 triggered
the dual approach of the Spanish labor market by removing the temporary nature requirement
for temporal contracts. While temporal contracts could have a duration between six months
and three years with severance payments of 12 days per year of service and be used for any type
of job, conditions for permanent contracts remained unchanged. In practice, it implied a large
gap between employment protection of workers subject to temporal and permanent contracts.
Figure 1. Total Number of Temporary Contracts and Total
Number of Employees in Non-Agricultural Private Sectors
Source: Garćıa-Pérez et al. (2016)
After the introduction of the reform, the Spanish labor market had gradually evolved towards
a dual structure. With two thirds of employees retaining a permanent status and the rest working
in a highly mobile market, Spain became the European country using temporal contracts more
intensively (Garćıa-Pérez et al., 2016). During the late 1980s, more than 90 percent of new
contracts were created under the temporal form implying a large gross job creation. At the same
time a general conversion rate of temporal to permanent contracts below 10 percent implied little
creation of permanent employment (Güell and Petrongolo, 2007). As Figure 1 shows, temporal
4On what follows, we refer to temporal contracts as opposed to the standard permanent contracts of Spanish
permanent workers.
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contracts sharply increased after the introduction of the 1984 labor market reform, representing
more than 30 percent of all employees in the early 1990s. Therefore, the main concern after
the liberalization of temporal contracts in 1984 was the generation of a segmented labor market
between unstable low-payed and stable high-payed jobs without a reduction of unemployment.
In fact, the 1984 reform affected the welfare of low-skilled working men by persistently reducing
their long-term employment and earnings prospects (Garćıa et al., 2016).
The precarious situation of temporal workers is further worsened by the role of labor unions.
In Spain, union membership is almost entirely composed by insiders and only those with stable
employment tend to participate in workers council elections (Rueda, 2007). Even though labor
unionism in Spain is rather low, over 80 percent of the workers are affected by union negotiations
(Amuedo-Dorantes, 2000; Rueda, 2007) due to the fact that once an agreement is signed it is
automatically extended to all companies within its functional level irrespective of their partici-
pation in collective bargaining. Since such agreements tend to focus on insider needs, the gap in
labor protection between outsiders and insiders becomes even wider (Amuedo-Dorantes, 2000).
Since 1994, several reforms have taken place attempting to reduce the broad labor market
dualism, through reducing the incidence of temporal contracts. To some extent, all reforms
restricted the conditions for the use of temporary contracts by gradually and mildly reducing
severance payments for permanent employees. Their effect has been limited since, by the mid-
2000’s, temporal employment rate still remained very high. While the number of temporary
contracts signed was more than 20 times the flow of net employment growth, only 6 percent of
them were converted to permanent contracts per annum (Bentolilla et al., 2012). After 2006,
and particularly from 2008 onwards, the large employment reaction to the crisis implied the
loss of 60 percent of the temporal jobs. Nowadays, the Spanish labor market remains strongly
dual, with two clearly identified segments of the population facing very different labor market
protection.
3.2 Economic Crisis
The period analyzed encompasses two extremely different economic contexts. The period 2002-
2007 can be characterized as strong employment growth. It was promoted by a significant
relaxation of credit access and a very large immigration inflow attracted by the specialization of
the Spanish economy in low value added and highly labor intense industries such as construction,
tourism or personal services (Bentolilla et al., 2012). Yet, in the period from 2008-2014, the
unemployment rate went from less than 10 percent in 2008 to 26 percent in 2014. This second
period can be characterized as a period of a strong crisis, where Spain became one of the first
countries of Europe in terms of unemployment. The economic crisis started to be noticeable
in 2007, mainly in the United States and other countries directly affected by the subprime
mortgage crisis. At that point, the Spanish economy was accumulating a 14 year-period of
continuous growth that helped reduce the unemployment level to 8 percent.
Following the standard definition of a recession regarding GDP variations, the first phase
of the crisis goes from the second quarter of 2008 to the end of 2009 and is characterized by
a 5 percentage point fall in GDP. According to Bentolilla et al. (2012), initially, the impact
of the crisis in Spain was not larger than in other European countries. The tightening of
financial conditions and the rise of risk perception resulted in a sharp fall in the value of agent’s
wealth, mainly represented by housing, tax increases and lower transfers. All of this lead to a
reduction in private consumption derived from a fall in household disposable income. The crisis
became particularly severe in 2012. A decrease in the real estate activity and employment in the
construction sector and industrial branches was accompanied by a more generalized contraction
of the internal demand. Due to the lack of competitiveness of the Spanish economy, the retraction
of the internal consumption could not be compensated by rising external demand. Combined
with a sovereign debt crisis, the facts described above lead to a financing crisis in the balance
of payments.
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Figure 2. Evolution of Unemployment Rate: 2002-2016
Source: Statistics Spain (INE)
Even though the magnitude of the crisis in terms of the fall in GDP is considerable, the most
representative measure of its severity comes from the impact in employment. The unemployment
rate in 2013 was over 26 percent, three times higher than the unemployment rate before the crisis.
During the first stages of the crisis, the lack of adequacy of labor conditions and lower dismissal
costs of temporary employees implied that the adjustment of the labor market mainly occurred
through temporal workers. This reduction in temporal employees, accounted for more than 60
percent of the total employee’s reduction (Ortega and Peñalosa, 2013), which disproportionately
affected young people and the lesser qualified. The lack of over exposition of permanent workers
can be represented by the fact that it was in 2011 when permanent employment fell for first
time below the 2007 level (Bentolilla et al., 2012). Besides differences in the intensity, all
workers have seen their jobs threatened and average time of unemployment has increased for
all segments of population. The percentage of unemployment with a duration larger than one
year increased from 21 percent before the crisis to 58 percent in 2013. Unemployment duration
became especially long for the young, older workers and those with low levels of formation,
bringing them in a situation of risk of exclusion from the labor market (Ortega and Peñalosa,
2013).
4 Empirical Analysis
The aim of this study is to analyze whether individuals holding a temporal contract, and there-
fore facing more disadvantages and higher risk positions in the labor market, have higher pref-
erences for redistribution than those holding permanent contracts. We also analyze whether
macroeconomic characteristics matter at the time of determining redistribution preferences as
well as the heterogeneous effect of temporal contracts depending on the macroeconomic con-
text. In order to identify the causal effect of holding a specific contract type on preferences for
redistribution, exact matching is used to identify treated and control groups. The analysis is
divided into two parts. First, the effect of holding a temporary contract is studied for the full
period. Second, heterogeneous effects depending on the economic context in which the survey
toke place as well as the effect of the macroeconomic environment are analyzed.
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4.1 Data
The measure of preferences for redistribution as well as control variables used to perform this
analysis come from the European Social Survey (ESS). Data for Spain is available for seven
rounds (2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014).
4.1.1 Preferences for Redistribution
The dependent variable used to identify preferences for income redistribution corresponds to the
question:
“Please say to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the following statements: The
government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels.”
Interviewees could respond by selecting one of the following five alternatives:5
(1) “Disagree Strongly”
(2) “Disagree”
(3) “Neither Agree nor Disagree”
(4) “Agree”
(5) “Strongly Agree”
Using this question as a dependent variable can engage in a debate about the formulation and
implications derived from the fact that redistribution can be implemented through two different
channels, namely taxation and spending. From the taxation side, redistribution implies that
those who are in a better-off position support higher taxes that will be transferred to the worse-
off. Therefore, the survey question considered leaves open the key idea that the rich would
be the donors (Ravallion and Lokshin, 2000) and do not remind people of higher taxes in case
of higher redistribution (Rehm, 2009). From the spending approach, in order to redistribute,
social expenditure, either through income transfers or increasing the welfare state, must be
targeted to the being worse-off. Thus, this question does not inform about the specific type of
policy used to achieve such a goal (Rehm, 2009). Despite this, multiple studies6 use this specific
question to approach redistribution preferences. What matters for this study are the individual
preferences for government redistribution as is seen as a social insurance against potential shocks
the individual may face. Therefore, it seems sufficient to approach individual preferences for
redistribution.
Another important aspect that should be considered is the distribution of the variable among
the different alternatives. As Figure 3 shows, more than 80 percent of the observations corre-
spond to categories 4 “Agree” and 5 “Strongly Agree”. Therefore, in general, respondents are
leaning toward support for redistribution and most of the variation we will observe will be among
the intensity of such a support.
5The original question is coded (1) Agree strongly (2) Agree (3) Neither Agree nor Disagree (4) Disagree (5)
Disagree Strongly (7) Refusal (8) Don’t know (9) No answer. To make the results easier to interpret, this variable
has been recoded in a way such as (5) corresponds to higher preferences for redistribution, (1) lower preferences
for redistribution and (7), (8) and (9) are treated as missed values.
6See Fernández-Albertos and Manzano (2016), Finseras (2009, 2012), Rehm (2009). For approximately the
same question from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), see Alt and Iversen (2017), Cusack et al.
(2006) or Corneo and Grüner (2002).
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Figure 3. Distribution of Preferences for Redistribution
Note: Non-matched sample
4.1.2 Contract Type
The hypothesis underlying this analysis is that individuals holding temporal contracts are more
exposed to risk than those with permanent contracts and, consequently, will have higher demands
for government redistribution. The main independent variable used to identify the effect of
temporal contracts corresponds to the question:
“Do/did you have a work contract. . . ”
where the possible alternatives7 respondents could answer are:
(0) ”Unlimited”
(1) “Fixed-termm”
Individuals not holding a labor contract are dropped from the sample bringing the total
number of observations considered to 8,492. The part of the sample considered as treated
are individuals holding a temporal contract and, as control, individuals holding an permanent
contract. The dualism of the Spanish labor market implies around 30 percent of the observations
in our sample are subject to contracts under a much laxer regulation and higher insecure working
conditions due to the fact of holding temporal contract.
4.1.3 Crisis
As stated before, the period of time that is being analyzed encompasses two very different
economic environments. The economic crisis that showed its firsts symptoms in Spain during
the third and fourth quarter of 2008 brought the unemployment rate from below 10 percent in
2008 to 26 percent in 2014, placing Spain in one of the first positions in Europe in terms of
unemployment.
7The original question is coded (1) “Unlimited”, (2) “Limited”, (3) “No contract”, (6) “Not applicable”, (7)
“Refusal”, (8) “Don’t know”, (9) No answer. To facilitate the interpretation of the analysis, the variable has been
recoded to (1) “Temporal” which corresponds to “Limited”, (0)“Permanent” which corresponds to “Unlimited”,
(3), (6), (7), (8) and (9) are considered as missed observations.
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In order to construct a variable accounting for the fact of being interviewed during the crisis
period or before, we look at the average unemployment of the period 2002-2014 for each region
as well as at the national level. Then, we compare the unemployment rate of the survey year
with the average unemployment of the region to see if it was above or below. In all cases,
the unemployment rate rises above the average unemployment from 2009. Therefore, a dummy
variable, namely crisis, that equals one for survey rounds after 2008 is constructed to account
for the period of higher unemployment.
4.2 Identification and Estimation
The main concern at the time of the empirical analysis comes from the fact that individuals
holding a temporal contract have different characteristics than those holding permanent con-
tracts. Some of the characteristics determining the fact of holding a temporal contract, such as
lower levels of education, being a female or belonging to a minority group (Morris and Vekker,
2001; Amuedo-Dorantes, 2000) are considered as individual determinants for redistribution pref-
erences. In order to deal with the problem of endogeneity, exact matching is employed. The
matching procedure selects individuals that, even though holding different contract types, are
equal in those observable characteristics determining both the fact of holding a temporal contract
and redistributive preferences. Therefore, the fact of holding a specific contract type is consid-
ered as random and it allows us to identify the effect of temporal contracts on redistribution
preferences.
4.2.1 Matching
The empirical strategy is that of selection on observables. The database is restricted to indi-
viduals holding a contract (either temporal or permanent) bringing the number of observation
from 13,549 down to 8,449. In order to identify characteristics determining the contract type
hold and therefore used for the matching procedure, a Probit8 model is been estimated using as
dependent variable a dummy equal to one if the individual holds a temporal contract and zero if
a permanent contract is held. After carrying out Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM), the anal-
ysis is performed on a matched sample of individuals that are equal in observed characteristics
and only differ in holding a temporal or permanent contract.
Since covariates used to perform the matching correspond to categorical variables9, exact
matching rather than a propensity score matching is used. Exact matching allows to choose ex-
ante the variables that should be balanced. In order to match treated and control observations,
it coarsens each variable into substantially meaningful groups (Blackwell et al., 2009). Variables
affecting both the probability of having a temporal contract and individual preferences for
redistribution must be used at the time of implementing matching. Once variables are defined,
matching generates strata of individuals with the same covariates and therefore, only differing in
the fact of being treated (if they hold a temporal contract) or control (if they hold a permanent
contract). In other words, exact matching divides the sample into strata in a way such that
all individuals inside of the same strata have exactly the same characteristics and only differ
in the type of contract hold. The fact of holding a specific contract is considered as random
and the causal effect of temporal contracts on preferences for redistribution can be estimated.
The underlying trade-off results from the number of strata and bins used to match individuals.
Larger bins will result in fewer strata, and fewer strata will result in more diverse observations
and, therefore, higher imbalance (Blackwell et al., 2009). Once matching is performed, the L1
statistic indicates the remaining global imbalance. The L1 statistic is a comprehensive measure
of global imbalance that takes a value equal to zero when complete balance exists and equal to
8Probit regression results are displayed in Table A.2. of the Appendix.
9Age is the only continuous variable used in the matching procedure. CEM is allowed to automatically coarsen
the variable based on an automatic coarsening algorithm that divides the variable in 14 intervals.
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one when the sample is completely imbalanced. This is an important fact, since the balance,
both in means and in the distribution, between control and treated group is what will allow for
the identification of temporal contract effect on preferences for redistribution.
Matching is a nonparametric method of controlling for confounding influence of pretreatment
control variables in observational data. This methodology allows us to estimate the sample
average treatment effect on the treated (SATT) without much model dependence (Iacus et al.,
2012). In order to satisfy the no omitted variable bias assumption, the treatment variable
must be independent of the potential outcomes conditional on covariates. If the covariates
determining the treatment, which in this case is the fact of holding a temporal contract, are
used in the matching procedure the treatment assignment becomes a random fact and the causal
effect can be estimated. Furthermore, exact matching restricts the matched data to areas of
common empirical support and meets the congruence principle, which states that the data space
and analysis space should be the same (Blackwell et al., 2009; Iacus et al., 2012).
The choice of variables is determined by a literature search focused on determinants of tem-
poral contracts and preferences for redistribution as well as by data availability. According to
Morris and Vekker (2001),10 temporal workers are less educated, more likely to belong to a
minority group and be females than their permanent contracts counterpart. Furthermore, those
individuals who have been temporarily unemployed, those working in the construction or agri-
culture sectors and the young are more likely to hold a temporal contract (Amuedo-Dorantes,
2000).11 Moreover, as discussed previously, these variable are also found to be individual deter-
minants of redistribution preferences (Finseraas, 2012; Cusack et al., 2006; Rehm, 2009, 2011;
Ravallion and Lokshin, 2000).
According to Garćıa-Pérez et al. (2016), the fact of entering the labor market after the 1984
reform, increased the probability of holding a temporal labor contract. Therefore, Reform84, a
dummy variable that equals one if the individual became 16 years old12 after 1984, and 0 other-
wise, accounts for it. Individuals are matched within each year of the survey in order to control
for unobserved heterogeneity at the year level. It should also be noticed that specific regional
variation cannot be eliminated by matching on regions due to the sample size.13 Gender, a
dummy variable that equals one if the respondent is a female; Education, a variable that equals
one if the highest level of education is lower than secondary education, two if it is secondary ed-
ucation but lower than tertiary education and three if the highest level of education corresponds
to tertiary education; and Minority, a dummy variable that equals one if the respondent belongs
to a minority ethnic group in Spain, accounts for the fact that temporal workers are more likely
to be women, less educated and belong to a minority group (Morris and Vekker, 2000) as well as
support higher redistribution (Finseraas, 2012; Rehm, 2009, among others). Furthermore, the
young and those who had been temporally unemployed are more likely to support redistribution
(Rehm, 2009 and 2011) as well as hold a temporal contract (Amuedo-Dorantes, 2000). There-
fore, Age a variable equal to the years of the respondent, and Unemployed12, a dummy variable
taking a value of 1 if the individual has been unemployed and looking for a job for a period of
12 months or more, account for the previous factors. Last, Ravallion and Lokshin (2000) find
that those living in a rural area have stronger preferences for redistribution. Thus, Domicile,
a dummy variable that equals to one if the respondent lives in a big city or suburbs, town or
small city accounts for it.
10Morris and Vekker (2001) use data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) in USA for the years 1995 and
1997.
11Amuedo-Dorantes (2000) uses data from the Spanish Labor Force Survey carried on in 1995 and 1996.
12The legal age to enter the labor market in Spain is established to be 16 years.
13The greatest share of the welfare spending in Spain is decentralized at the regional level through education,
health and social protection. Thus, there are significant differences among regions, both in population character-
istics and redistributive policies, that we need to control for. The ideal matching would be within regions but
since the sample size is not large enough this is not possible. We take into account this possible source of variation
in the empirical analysis by including regional fixed effects in every model specification.
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Table 1. Differences in Means Between Treated and





Gender 0.532 0.423 -9.213 (0.000)
Education 1.898 1.990 5.440 (0.000)
Reform84 0.648 0.354 -25.584 (0.000)
Age 38.232 49.012 28.307 (0.000)
Unemployed12m 0.323 0.152 -17.962 (0.000)
Domicile 0.534 0.627 7.870 (0.000)
Minority 0.043 0.018 -6.356 (0.000)
Matched Sample
Gender 0.523 0.523 0.00 (1.000)
Education 1.937 1.937 -0.00 (1.000)
Reform84 0.637 0.637 -0.00 (1.000)
Age 38.186 39.171 -0.87 (0.385)
Unemployed12m 0.261 0.261 0.00 (1.000)
Domicile 0.559 0.559 -0.00 (1.000)
Minority 0.005 0.005 -0.00 (1.000)
Note: Treated group corresponds to individuals holding a
temporal contract. Control corresponds to individuals hold-
ing permanent contract.)
Therefore, the individual level variables used in the matching procedure correspond to Gen-
der, Education, Reform84, Age Unemployed12m, Domicile, Year and Minority.14 Results of the
Probit estimation are displayed in Table A.2 of the Appendix, which shows that all variables
included in the matching have coefficients as expected and a statistically significant effect on
the probability of holding a temporal contract.
In order to identify the effect of temporal contracts, control and treated groups must be bal-
anced in observable characteristics. Table 1 shows that in the unmatched sample this condition
is not satisfied. In the original sample, all variables described above are significantly different
in the treated and control groups. Therefore, the effect of temporal contracts cannot be studied
since it would be biased by other variables influencing redistribution preferences. Thus, exact
matching is needed in order to balance the covariates between individuals holding a temporal
and a permanent contract. In order to determine whether or not a good matching is achieved, a
comparison of means and distributions between treated and control individuals in the matched
and unmatched sample is done. In the Appendix, Table A.3 shows that once the sample is
matched none of the differences between treated and control groups are statistically significant,
neither in their mean values or distributions. Furthermore, L1 statistic informs of the overall
variance reduction as well as the individual variance remaining. The L1 multivariate distance is
reduced from 0.608 before the matching to 0.363 once the matching is done and the only variable
that is not perfectly balanced is age.15
In order to ensure that the distribution of the dependent variable has not been altered by
the matching procedure, Figure 4 displays the distribution of preferences for redistribution of
the matched sample. We can observe that, as showed previously, more than 80 percent of the
variation occurs in the highest levels of preferences. Furthermore, the distribution shows that
the share of individuals in category five, is higher for individuals holding temporal rather than
permanent contract. This relation is the opposite in all other levels.
14Table A.1 of the Appendix shows the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis for the pre
and post matched samples.
15See Table A.3 in the Appendix.
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Figure 4. Distribution of Preferences for Redistribution by Con-
tract Type
Note: Marched sample.
Finally, since the matched sample is balanced in the characteristics determining both the
fact of holding a temporal labor contract and preferences for redistribution, we are comparing
very similar individuals, interviewed in the same period of time. By estimating an Ordered Logit
model that accounts for the categorical characteristic of the dependent variable, we are able to
identify the causal effect of holding a temporal contract on preferences for redistribution.
4.2.2 Estimation
When the matching procedure is exact, a simple difference in means is enough to obtain the
treatment effect (Blackwell et al., 2009). In this case, some minor imbalance remains in the
matched sample and therefore a parametric model controlling for the variables used in the
matching procedure is estimated (Iacus et al., 2012). The use of a parametric frameworks
allows to choose the most appropriate estimation model. In this case, due to the categorical
characteristic of the dependent variable, a series of Ordered Logit models are estimated based
on the following specification:
PreferencesRedistributioni,t = α+ βTemporali,t + γXi,t + εi,t (1)
where PreferencesRedistribution is the dependent variable and corresponds to preferences
for redistribution of individual i interviewed in year t. Temporal is the main variable of interest
and equals to one if individual i holds a temporal contract and zero if individual i holds an
permanent contract. The vector of control variables is denoted as X. The residuals, ε, are
assumed to be identical and independently distributed.
The first hypothesis to be tested states that holding a temporal contract increases the risk
perceived by an individual and therefore has a positively influence in redistribution preferences.
Therefore, the β coefficient of Temporal is expected to be positive and statistically significant.
If this is the case, it would provide causal evidence in support of the insurance theory. In order
to account for the observation importance, estimators require weighting observations according
to the size of their strata (Blackwell et al., 2009; Iacus et al., 2012). Therefore, in all regres-
sions, iweights are applied. First, preferences for redistribution are estimated as a function of
temporal contracts. Second, we include regional dummies to control for omitted variables that
can determine both redistribution preferences and the contract type hold. Since Spain is made
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up of 17 regions, with different levels of wealth as well as individual characteristics, including
regional fixed effects controls for regional variation that could not be eliminated through the
matching procedure. Third, we include temporal fixed effects. Even though matching is per-
formed based on the survey year, controlling for temporal fixed effects eliminates the remaining
variation derived from yearly specific factors. Fourth, as a robustness check, the variables used
in the matching procedure are included as controls. Including the matching variables helps con-
trol for such variance and provide a more accurate estimator. This specification is the preferred
specification.
Furthermore, as a robustness check, extra controls are included that can effect preferences
for redistribution. Even though left-right wing is a factor influencing redistribution preferences
(Cusack et al., 2006; Berens, 2015; Fernández-Albertos and Manzano, 2016) it is not included in
the matching procedure to avoid an increase in strata that would bring a substantial reduction
in the matched sample. In addition, it is not clear which one is the best division of the ten points
scale used to codify the variable. Adding left-right wing alignment as a control, allows to check
that the effect being attributed to temporal contracts does not belong to ideological factors.
Next, including crisis as a control allows to assess if the adverse macroeconomic situation had
an effect by itself in determining preferences for redistribution. While keeping the coefficient
of temporal contracts stable, ensures that the effect found does not belong to the period of
time considered. In addition, the fact of belonging to a labor union is positively related with
redistribution preferences (Ravallion and Lokshin, 2000; Cusack et al., 2006). At the same time,
in the Spanish case, are mainly permanent workers the ones that belong to a labor union or
company’s committees (Rueda, 2007). In our sample, the Labor − Union variable is not available
for the 2012 survey. Therefore, in order to keep data from the 2012 survey in the sample, the
variable is opted to be included as a control rather than in the matching procedure. Finally,
it is widely stated in the literature that income is a major factor determining preferences for
redistribution (Cusack et al., 2006; Finseraas, 2009; Iversen and Soskice, 2001; etc.). Different
codifications and missed observations of the variable in the ESS do not allow to sort observations
in homogeneous groups to be used in the matching procedure. Therefore, a dummy variable
that equals to one if the individual has income above the median and zero otherwise is used to
control for potential effects that income might have in redistribution preferences.
In order to account for heterogeneous effects derived from the adverse economic context, a
second model is estimated as follows:
PreferencesRedistributioni,t = α+ β1Temporali,t + β2Crisist
+β3Temporali,t ∗ Crisist + γXi,t + εi,t
(2)
If the adverse macroeconomic situation increases the perceived risk, and the perceived risk
positively effects redistribution preferences, β2 should be positive and significant. As in the
previous case, β1 is expected to be positive and significant, indicating a positive effect of holding
a temporal contract on preferences for redistribution. Furthermore, a positive and significant
β3 would indicate that, ceteris paribus, in the crisis period the increase in risk perception has
a stronger effect for individuals holding a temporal contract. Therefore, it would give support
to the hypothesis that individual rather than macroeconomic characteristics matter more at the
time of shaping redistribution preferences. On the contrary, a negative and significant effect of
β3 would mitigate the effect of holding a temporal contract type in redistribution preferences
indicating that the macroeconomic context matters more than the individual characteristics.
Since the matching we are using to perform such estimation is based on the year of the survey,
we are considering the effect of temporal contracts on individuals that are interviewed in the
same year and thus, during the pre or post crisis period.
In summary, the first regression will inform of the causal effect of holding a temporal con-
tract on choosing one of the five levels of redistribution described before. The second regression
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will allow us to assess heterogeneous effects of temporal contracts depending on the macroeco-
nomic context as well as the impact of the adverse economic environment by itself. Using non-
parametric models after matching allows to estimate the impact of temporal contracts without
much model dependence (Iacus et al., 2012). Adding individual variables used in the matching
procedure as well as regional and temporal fixed effects in the model, helps to control for omit-
ted variable bias and increase the precision of the estimates. Moreover, considering additional
controls that were discarded from the final matching specification due to data limitations as
robustness checks help us assess the consistency of the results.
5 Results
In this section we present the results of the two models introduced in the previous section. First,
we present the baseline results that show the effect of temporal contracts on redistribution
preferences. Second, we present the results taking into account the heterogeneous effect of
contracts before and after the crisis as well as compare how the crisis effected preferences for
redistribution of individuals depending on the contract type.
5.1 Baseline Results
Table 2 reports the main results of the Ordered Logit estimation of Model 1. Results reported in
column 1 show that holding a temporal labor contract increases preferences for redistribution.
Furthermore, this effect remains positive and significant in all specifications. This result holds
and remains stable whether including regional (column 2) and temporal fixed effects (column 3)
or controlling for left-right ideology (column 5), belonging to a labor union (column 7), or having
income above the median (column 8). Regression number four is the preferred specification,
since it corresponds to the observations which derive directly from the matching procedure.
Using this specification allows for the identification of the causal effect of holding a temporal
contract, while also controlling for potential regional heterogeneity. Thus we are comparing
treated and control groups that are statistically similar. Adding further controls, the coefficient
of interest remains stable and, therefore, gives extra support to the positive coefficient estimated
in regression number four. Another fact that should be discussed is the need to perform the
analysis using all five categories of redistribution preferences. Since the number of observations
belonging to those categories supporting less redistribution is low, one could think that they can
be collapsed. In Table 2, the cut-point test shows that none of the categories can be collapsed.
Therefore, the analysis must be performed using the five possible categories described above.
One drawback of Order Logit estimations is that it presents results that are not directly
interpretable. Even though being statistically significant, we cannot see if they are quantitatively
meaningful. In order to interpret the real magnitude of the estimation, marginal effects have to
be computed for each of the five categories of preferences for redistribution.
Figure 5 represents the estimated average marginal effects (AME) for each of the five possible
categories of redistribution preferences. The marginal effect is computed as the difference in the
predicted value of probability of choosing one of the five categories as the temporal contract
variable changes from zero (permanent contract) to one (temporal contract), while all other
variables are held constant at their mean values. Intuitively, it treats an individual i as though
s/he holds a temporal contract regardless of the type of contract that is actually being held
and computes the probability this individual would support preferences for redistribution j.
Then, it treats the same individual i as if s/he holds a permanent contract and computes again
the probability of supporting the same level of redistribution j. The difference between both
probabilities is the marginal effect of the individual i on supporting preferences j. Once this
process is repeated for all the sample, the average of such marginal effects gives the AME
of temporal contracts of preferences for redistribution. The results indicate that the fact of
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Table 2. Effects of Temporal Contracts on Preferences for Redistribution
Ordered Logit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Temporal 0.177*** 0.174*** 0.182*** 0.187*** 0.182*** 0.182*** 0.188*** 0.203***
(0.052) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.057) (0.057) (0.081) (0.072)
Crisis 0.980*** 0.994*** 1.012***
(0.110) (0.152) (0.133)
Region dummies NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year dummies NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES
Matching Variables NO NO NO YES YES YES YES YES
Left-Right NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES
Labor-Union NO NO NO NO NO NO YES YES
Income NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES
N 5816 5816 5816 5816 5168 5168 4390 3239
Cut test: T1=T2 248.09 248.23 248.9 249.27 232.08 232.08 200.32 153.55
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Cut test: T2=T3 601.34 601.95 604.29 605.69 543.75 543.75 483.15 333.9
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Cut test: T3=T4 3636.76 3625.82 3605.01 3594.6 3228.1 3228.1 2834.68 2007.4
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Notes: (i) The dependent variable corresponds to PreferencesRedistribution. (ii) Standard errors are in parenthesis. (iii)
Cut-Point test : test indicating whether the cuts delimiting two contiguous categories are equal in order to reduce the
number of categories by collapsing them. p-values in brackets. *** Denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level
and * at the 10% level.
changing from an permanent to a temporal contract has a positive effect on the probability
of agreeing with the highest level of redistribution. This effect is negative for the probability
of supporting any of the other levels. Specifically, Table 3 shows that when changing from a
permanent to a temporal contract, the probability of strongly agreeing with “The government
should take measures to reduce differences in income levels” increases by 0.041 percentage points.
Conversely, when changing from a permanent to a temporal labor contract, the likelihoods of
agreeing, neither agreeing or disagreeing, disagreeing and strongly disagreeing fall by 0.016,
0.014, 0.009 and 0.002 percentage points respectively.
Table 3. Marginal Effects of Temporal Labor Contracts on Redistribution Preferences
Categories









(a) Marginal Effect -0.002** -0.009*** -0.014*** -0.016*** 0.041***
(b) Prob(PrefRedist=j | Temporal=0) 0.011 0.057 0.105 0.489 0.338
Effect in % = (a) / (b) -18.18% -15.79% -13.08% -3.27% 12.13%
Note: Marginal effects correspond to the estimation of Model 1 reported in Column 4 of Table 2. *** Denotes
significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level.
In order to appreciate correctly the magnitude of those changes, it is important to put
them into perspective by considering the baseline probabilities of supporting each category of
redistribution preferences. Therefore, as Table 3 shows, the fact of holding a temporal contract
increases the likelihood of an individual strongly agreeing with “The government should take
measures to reduce differences in income levels” by 12.13 percent. As previously seen, this is
the only category that is positively affected by the fact of holding a temporal contract. While
the likelihood of agreeing with the previous statement decreases by 3.27 percent, the magnitude
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Figure 5. Marginal Effects of Temporal Contracts on Preferences
for Redistribution
Note: Marginal effects correspond to the estimation of Model 1 reported
in Column 4 of Table 2.
of the effect becomes larger for lower categories and implies 18.18 percent lower probability of
strongly agreeing. This result indicates that the fact of holding a temporal contract has a positive
effect on individual preferences for redistribution since it considerably increases the probability
of strongly agreeing with the statement in consideration, while decreasing the probability of
being grouped under one of the other categories. Since individuals holding temporal contracts
face more risk derived from their precarious situation in the labor market, their preferences for
redistribution are higher and, therefore, results give causal evidence in support of the insurance
theory.
5.2 Heterogeneous Effects
Columns 6, 7 and 8 of Table 2 show a strong positive effect of the crisis over preferences for re-
distribution. Therefore, we extend the study to assess the heterogeneous effect that the contract
type has on different macroeconomic contexts. Estimating Model 2, we are able to identify if
what matters more in an adverse macroeconomic context at the time to determine redistribution
preferences are individual or macroeconomic conditions.
As we have already seen, even when controlling for the economic crisis, holding a temporal
labor contract has a positive and statistically significant effect on preferences for redistribution.
On the other hand, Column one of Table 4 shows that Crisis has a positive statistically sig-
nificant effect, at 99 percent confidence, consistent to the different specifications. This result
suggests that a more uncertain and risky economic context increases redistribution preferences
by itself. The interesting result here rises when we look at the interaction between temporal
contract and crisis. Column 1 of Table 4 shows that the coefficient on the interaction term is
negative and statistically significant, implying a mitigation of the contract type effect during the
crisis period. In order to assess the magnitude of the effect, margins need to be computed. Re-
sults hold and remain stable, whether including regional fixed effects (column 2), controlling for
left-right alignment (column 4), belonging to a labor union (column 5) or having income above
the median (column 6). As in the previous section, regression three is the preferred specification
since it corresponds to those observations which derive directly from the matching procedure
and corresponds to a treated and control groups that are statistically similar. Since coefficients
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Table 4. Effect of the Crisis and Temporal Contract on Preferences for Redistribution
Ordered Logit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Temporal 0.292*** 0.281*** 0.285*** 0.270*** 0.261*** 0.307***
(0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.074) (0.075) (0.091)
Crisis ∗ Temporal -0.282*** -0.257** -0.250** -0.227** -0.238* -0.286**
(0.106) (0.106) (0.106) (0.113) (0.127) (0.146)
Crisis 0.557*** 0.536*** 0.459*** 0.490*** 0.569*** 0.536***
(0.063) (0.063) (0.067) (0.071) (0.08) (0.091)
Region dummies NO YES YES YES YES YES
Matching Characteristics NO NO YES YES YES YES
Left-Right NO NO NO YES YES YES
Labor-Union NO NO NO NO YES YES
Income NO NO NO NO NO YES
N 5816 5816 5816 5168 4390 3239
Cut test: T1=T2 248.35 248.47 248.83 231.64 199.91 153.2
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Cut test: T2=T3 602.31 602.83 604.27 542.33 481.81 332.95
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Cut test: T3=T4 3615.17 3605.29 3595.29 3229.89 2836.26 2010.14
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Notes: (i) The dependent variable corresponds to PreferencesRedistribution. (ii) Standard errors are in
parenthesis. (iii) Cut-Point test : test indicating whether the cuts delimiting two contiguous categories are
equal in order to reduce the number of categories by collapsing them. p-values in brackets. *** Denotes
significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level.
of interest remain considerably stable with the introduction of further controls, we consider them
consistent. Furthermore, the cut-point test indicates that categories of redistribution preferences
cannot be collapsed.
The only variable that remains slightly imbalanced in its distribution after the matching
is Age. As a robustness check, we have repeated the analysis for individuals who entered the
labor market ten years before and after the 1984 labor market. Reducing the sample allows us
to compare individuals that are more homogeneous in terms of age but still affected differently
by the incidence of temporal contracts (Garćıa-Pérez et al., 2016). Table A.6. of the Appendix
shows that results for the restricted sample are consistent with those presented here.
In order to assess the regression coefficient, Figure 6 shows the marginal effect of holding a
temporal contract on the five categories of redistribution preferences in the pre and post crisis
periods.16 Panel (a) shows that in the pre-crisis period the fact of holding a temporal contract
increases the probability of strongly agree with redistribution and decreases the probability of
being grouped in any of the other categories. Those effects are no longer significant in the
post-crisis period represented in panel b. Furthermore, Table 5 displays the magnitudes of such
marginal effects. In the pre-crisis scenario presented in Panel (a) of Table 5, the fact of holding
a temporal contract increases the likelihood of supporting the highest level of redistribution
preferences by 0.06 percentage points. When assessing the magnitude of the effect, holding a
temporal contract increases the likelihood of being grouped in this category by 22.55 percent.
However, as Figure 6 shows, this effect is negative for the rest of the categories. In this scenario,
16To ensure that the marginal effects found with the estimation of Model 2 do not derive from different char-
acteristics of individuals in the two economic contexts determining preferences for redistribution, as a robustness
check we add at the Regression 3 reported in Table 4 the interactions of the crisis variable with all the variables
used in the matching process. Tables A.4 and A.5 in the Appendix shows that marginal effects remain significant
and consistent.
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Figure 6. Marginal Effects of Temporal Contracts on Preferences
for Redistribution
Note: Marginal effects correspond to the estimation of Model 2 reported
in Column 3 of Table 4.
the effect of holding a temporal contract increases the likelihood of strongly agreeing by 22.55
percent while decreases the probability of disagreeing by 24.59 percent. In the post-crisis period,
the effect of temporal contracts on redistribution preferences is no longer significant for any of
the five possible categories. The results suggest that the perceived risk is a strong determinant of
redistribution preferences and provides support to the insurance theory. If redistribution is seen
as a social insurance, preferences will increase when risk in the labor market is also increasing
(Cusack et al., 2006).
In order to assess the macroeconomic influence on redistribution preferences depending on
individual characteristics, Figure 7 reports the marginal effects of the economic crisis on redis-
tribution preferences depending on the contract type. We can observe that in both cases the
crisis increases the probability of supporting the highest level of redistribution while there is a
negative effect in the remaining categories.
Panel (a) in Table 6 shows that the crisis increases the probability of strongly agreeing with
redistribution among individuals holding a temporal contract by 0.049 percentage points. It
implies that, in the crisis period, they are 14 percent more likely to be grouped under this
category. As in previous cases, the probability of agreeing with other categories is affected
negatively. The magnitude of the effect becomes larger when redistribution support is weaker.
While individuals are 4.73 percent less likely of agreeing with redistribution, the probability of
strongly disagreeing turns out to be 23.53 percent lower. Panel (b) reports the marginal effects
of the crisis for individuals holding permanent contracts and shows that the magnitude of the
crisis’ effect is larger than for those holding a temporal contract. In this case, the probability
of strongly agreeing with redistribution increases by 0.102 percentage points, implying that
those individuals holding a permanent contract are 37.1 percent more likely to strongly agree
with redistribution in the post-crisis period than before. After the crisis, individuals holding
permanent contracts are less likely to agree with all the remaining categories of redistribution.
Even though they are only 7.3 percent less likely to agree with redistribution, the probability of
disagreeing with it decreases by 0.023 percentage points, meaning that they are 37.71 percent
less likely to be grouped under this category.
Therefore, the results show that individual characteristics have a predominant role defining
redistribution preferences when the macroeconomic context is favorable. The effect of the con-
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Table 5. Marginal Effects of Temporal Contracts on Redistribution Preferences.
Categories










(I) Marginal Effect -0.003*** -0.015*** -0.023*** -0.020*** 0.062***
(II) Prob(PrefRedist=j|Temporal=0) 0.015 0.061 0.116 0.533 0.275
Effect in % = (I) / (II) -20.00% -24.59% -19.83% -3.75% 22.55%
(b) Crisis=1
(I) Marginal Effect -0.0003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.004 0.008
(II) Prob(PrefRedist=j|Temporal=0) 0.007 0.052 0.088 0.428 0.425
Effect in % = (I) / (II) -4.29% -1.92% -2.27% -0.93% 1.88%
Note: Marginal effects correspond to the estimation of Model 2 reported in Column 3 of Table 4. *** Denotes
significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level.
Table 6. Crisis Marginal Effects on Redistribution Preferences by Contract Type
Categories










(I) Marginal Effect -0.002** -0.009** -0.015** -0.023** 0.049**
(II) Prob(PrefRedist=j|Crisis=0) 0.008 0.05 0.105 0.486 0.35
Effect in % = (I) / (II) -23.53% -18.00% -14.29% -4.73% 14.00%
(b) Permanent Contract
(I) Marginal Effect -0.005*** -0.023*** -0.036*** -0.039*** 0.102***
(II) Prob(PrefRedist=j|Crisis=0) 0.015 0.061 0.116 0.534 0.275
Effect in % = (I) / (II) -33.33% -37.71% -30.90% -7.30% 37.10%
Note: Marginal effects correspond to the estimation of Model 2 reported in Column (3) of Table 4. *** Denotes
significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level.
tract type disappears due to an increase in redistribution preferences of those with permanent
contracts when the macroeconomic context is adverse. It indicates that macroeconomic charac-
teristics, rather than individual determinants, affect those with lower risk perception and make
them support higher redistribution levels.
6 Conclusion
An extended body of literature has tried to disentangle the mechanisms behind the formation
of redistribution preferences. Although existing research reveals interesting relations explaining
redistribution demand, little is known about the impact of the macroeconomic context in shaping
redistribution preferences. Even though it is well stated in the redistribution as insurance
literature that the risk faced at the individual level is a main factor determining redistribution
demand, an adverse macroeconomic context might alter the perceived risk independently of
the individual characteristics. While social distance models together with ethnic and racial
heterogeneity predict that increases in inequality will lead to lower preferences for redistribution
through the over representation of the minorities among the poor (Lupu and Pontusson, 2011;
Alesina and Glaeser 2004), social-insurance models predict that preferences for redistribution
will depend on the risk faced by the individual and the distribution of inequality (Alt and
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Figure 7. Marginal Effects of the Economic Crisis on Preferences
for Redistribution
Note: Marginal effects correspond to the estimation of Model 2 reported
in Column 3 of Table 4.
Iversen, 2017; Cusack et al., 2006). Moreover, when looking at dual labor markets dynamics
determining redistribution preferences might respond to different logics (Fernández-Alberto and
Manzanos, 2014; Barens, 2015).
Applying exact matching to survey data from the European Social Survey for the period
2002-2014, we find causal evidence that in the Spanish dual labor market temporal contracts are
positively related to preferences for redistribution. The results show that risk perception is an
important factor determining redistribution preferences and provides support to the insurance
theory. We find evidence supporting the first hypothesis according to which the fact of holding
a temporal contract, and therefore facing higher risk in the labor market, has a positive effect in
redistribution preferences. The results show being a temporal worker increases the probability
of strongly agreeing with the statement that “the government should take measures to reduce
differences in income levels” in 12.13 percent, while it reduces the probability of supporting any
of the other options.
Interestingly, when assessing the heterogeneous effect of temporal contracts derived from the
adverse macroeconomic context, the effect of holding a temporal contract loses significance at
the time of determining individual preferences for redistribution. Therefore, we find evidence
showing that under an adverse economic context, individuals facing more stable situations in the
labor market are the ones that increase the most their redistribution preferences. Individuals
holding a permanent contract are 37.1 percent more likely to strongly agree with redistribution
when the economic situation is riskier, while the probability of individuals holding a temporal
contract increases by 14 percent. Social insurance theory provides a good explanation for this
change in the effect of the contract. In the pre-crisis period, with unemployment rates below
12 percent, individuals holding a permanent contract could see their labor market situation
as secure. Their protection in the labor market is stronger compared to individuals holding
temporal contract and therefore, the risk they face is lower. After the crisis, an economic
context where the unemployment rate exceeded the 25 percent and the use of the of partial
unemployment was becoming more common independently of the contract type, insecurity in
the labor market extends beyond temporary workers. The effect of the contract disappears since
the crisis has a positive effect for individuals holding temporal contracts, but the magnitude of
such an effect is higher for those holding permanent contracts. Therefore, it gives support to
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the second hypothesis according to which macroeconomic characteristics have a stronger impact
on individual preferences when the economic context becomes adverse.
If the risk perception of those who are in more protected position in the labor market de-
termine the redistribution demand, individuals in a more precarious position due to holding a
temporal contracts are doubly disadvantaged. First, they face higher instability derived from
low conversion rates into protected contracts (Güell and Petrongolo, 2007) and lower earnings
(Garćıa-Pérez et al., 2016). Secondly, political support for those categories of social-insurance
that would benefit them is reduced. On the other hand, the macroeconomic context plays an
important role in determining redistribution preferences. If redistribution demand increases
when the economic context is adverse independently on the contract, protection for those in a
more disadvantaged position derived from the contract type, might see their protection increase.
This study gives causal evidence supporting the Social Insurance theory and complements ex-
isting literature in identifying individual determinants of redistribution preferences. Learning
about the different motivations toward redistribution preferences will allow us to learn more
about voting behavior. Even though preferences become stronger when the risk in the labor
market increases, distrust in the government might inhibit voters from translating such concerns
through their vote (Kuziemko et al., 2015).
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[] Lübker, M. (2006). Inequality and the demand for redistribution: are the assumptions of the
new growth theory valid? Socio-Economic Review, 5(1):117–148.
[] Lupu, N. and Pontusson, J. (2011). The structure of inequality and the politics of redistribu-
tion. American Political Science Review, 105(2):316–336.
[] Meltzer, A. H. and Richard, S. F. (1981). A rational theory of the size of government. Journal
of political Economy, 89(5):914–927.
[] Moene, K. O. and Wallerstein, M. (2001). Inequality, social insurance, and redistribution.
American Political Science Review, 95(4):859–874.
[] Moene, K. O. and Wallerstein, M. (2003). Earnings inequality and welfare spending: A
disaggregated analysis. World Politics, 55(4):485–516.
[] Morris, M. D. and Vekker, A. (2001). An alternative look at temporary workers, their choices,
and the growth in temporary employment. Journal of Labor Research, 22(2):373–390.
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Appendices
Table A1. Definition of the Variables and Descriptive Statistics
Variable Definition Before Matching After Matching
Mean St. Dev Mean St. Dev
Prefdist Question (1-5); 4.092 0.889 4.112 0.867
1: Strongly Disagree,
2: Disagree;
3: Neither Agree nor Disagree;
4: Agree;
5: Strongly Agree
Temporal Dummy variable. 0.310 0.462 0.351 0.477
1: Temporal Contract;
0: Permanent Contract
Crisis Dummy variable. 0.435 0.496 0.419 0.493
1: Year interview after 2008;
0: Year interview 2008 or before.
Gender Dummy variable. 0.457 0.498 0.523 0.499
1: Female;
0: Male.
Left-Right Question (0-10); 4.355 2.067 4.312 2.041
0: Left, 1: Right.
Labor-Union Dummy variable. 0.223 0.416 0.187 0.390
1: is/has been member of a labor union.
Education Highest level of education achieved. 1.962 0.706 1.937 0.637
1: Lower than secondary education;
2: Secondary, lower than tertiary education;
3: Tertiary education.
Income Dummy variable. 0.334 0.472 0.308 0.462
1: Income above the median;
0: Income below the median.
Reform84 Dummy variable. 0.445 0.497 0.637 0.481
1: Became 16 years old after 1984.
Age Age of the respondent in years 45.672 16.618 39.045 15.014
Unemployed12m Dummy variable. 0.205 0.404 0.261 0.439
1: Has been unemployed and seeking for work
for a period of 12 months or more.
Domicile Dummy variable. 0.598 0.490 0.559 0.495
1: Respondent lives in a big city,
suburbs or outskirts of a big city, town or small city.
0: Respondent lives in a country village,
farm or home in countryside.
Minority Dummy variable. 0.026 0.159 0.005 0.073
1: Respondent belongs to a minority
ethnic group in Spain.
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Table A2. Determinants of contract type. Pro-
bit estimation before and after matching
Non-matched Sample
Coefficient z-stat
Gender 0.271 (8.55) ***
Education -0.432 (-16.54) ***
Reform84 0.246 (4.80) ***
Age -0.028 (-16.38) ***
Unemployed12m 0.606 (16.37) ***
Domicile -0.185 (-5.76) ***
Minority 0.429 (4.52) ***
Constant 1.266 (10.82) ***
Number observations 8094
Pseudo-R2 0.152
LR – Chi2 1522.48
[0.000]
Notes: Dependent variable is Temporal (dummy equal to
one if the contract hold is a temporal contract and zero if
it is an permanent contract). *** Denotes significance at
the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level.




L1 distance min 25% 50% 75% max
Gender 0.109 0 0 1 0 0
Education 0.087 0 0 0 -1 0
Reform84 0.294 0 0 1 0 0
Age 0.292 1 -10 -13 -15 -8
Unemployed12m 0.171 0 0 0 1 0
Domicile 0.092 0 0 0 0 0
Minority 0.024 0 0 0 0 0
Multivariate L1 distance 0.608
(b) Matched Sample
Distribution
L1 distance min 25% 50% 75% max
Gender 6.90E-16 0 0 0 0 0
Education 6.70E-16 0 0 0 0 0
Reform84 1.60E-15 0 0 0 0 0
Age 0.089 2 0 0 -1 -1
Unemployed12m 1.00E-15 0 0 0 0 0
Domicile 7.20E-16 0 0 0 0 0
Minority 1.20E-16 0 0 0 0 0
Multivariate L1 distance 0.363
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Table A4. Marginal Effects of Temporal Contracts on Redistribution Preferences: Robustness
Check
Categories










(I) Marginal Effect -0.003*** -0.015*** -0.023*** -0.019*** 0.061***
(II) Prob(PrefRedist=j|Temporal=0) 0.015 0.061 0.116 0.533 0.275
Effect in % = (I) / (II) -20.00% -24.59% -19.83% -3.56% 22.18%
(b) Crisis=1
(I) Marginal Effect -0.0003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.004 0.008
(II) Prob(PrefRedist=j|Temporal=0) 0.007 0.052 0.088 0.428 0.425
Effect in % = (I) / (II) -4.29% -1.92% -2.27% -0.93% 1.88%
Note: Marginal effects derive from the estimation of Model (2) regression of the Column 3 of Table 4 adding as
further controls the interaction between the variable Crisis and all the variables used in the matching procedure.
*** Denotes significance at 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level.
Table A5. Crisis Marginal Effects on Redistribution Preferences by Contract Type. Robust-
ness Check
Categories










(I) Marginal Effect -0.002** -0.009** -0.015** -0.021** 0.048**
(II) Prob(PrefRedist=j|Crisis=0) 0.008 0.05 0.105 0.486 0.35
Effect in % = (I) / (II) -23.53% -18.00% -14.29% -4.32% 13.71%
(b) Permanent Contract
(I) Marginal Effect -0.005*** -0.023*** -0.036*** -0.036*** 0.101***
(II) Prob(PrefRedist=j|Crisis=0) 0.015 0.061 0.116 0.534 0.275
Effect in % = (I) / (II) -33.33% -37.71% -30.90% -6.74% 36.73%
Note: Marginal effects derive from the estimation of Model (2) regression of the Column 3 of Table 4 adding as
further controls the interaction between the variable Crisis and all the variables used in the matching procedure.
*** Denotes significance at 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level.
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Table A6. Effect of Crisis and Temporal Contract on Preferences for Re-
distribution. Restricted Sample.
Ordered Logit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Temporal 0.306*** 0.290*** 0.290*** 0.275** 0.274** 0.300**
(0.105) (0.100) (0.107) (0.116) (0.116) (0.140)
Crisis*Temporal -0.503*** -0.475*** -0.476** -0.416** -0.469** -0.521**
(0.167) (0.168) (0.169) (0.179) (0.201) (0.227)
Crisis 0.571*** 0.560*** 0.411*** 0.498*** 0.435*** 0.275
(0.099) (0.100) (0.140) (0.149) (0.162) (0.186)
Region dummies NO YES YES YES YES YES
Matching Variables NO NO YES YES YES YES
Left-Right NO NO NO YES YES YES
Labor-Union NO NO NO NO YES YES
Income NO NO NO NO NO YES
N 2362 2362 2362 2136 1854 1395
Cut test: T1=T2 96.12 96.11 96.25 86.47 79.32 58.44
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Cut test: T2=T3 250.34 250.54 251.08 232.55 209.47 147.77
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Cut test: T3=T4 1454.84 1448.57 1442.57 1309.42 1168.67 849.44
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Notes: (i) The dependent variable corresponds to PreferencesRedistribution. (ii) Standard errors
are in parenthesis. (iii) Cut-Point test : test indicating whether the cuts delimiting two contiguous
categories are equal in order to reduce the number of categories by collapsing them. p-values in
brackets. *** Denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level.
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